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The reason satellite positioning is not used as the primary guidance method is that the system is too vulnerable and easily susceptible to jamming.


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2020-06-22

  With the launch of one more satellite, the BeiDou system will complete its global constellation. Like the U.S. GPS, BeiDou can provide positioning and timing services worldwide. Compared to GPS’s timing accuracy of 50 nanoseconds, BeiDou’s 20-nanosecond precision represents a significant improvement, offering a highly accurate reference for multi-station time‑measurement equipment.

  Online, many self-media outlets speculate that missile strikes will never miss their targets. However, they also warn of U.S. attempts to jam our satellite‑based positioning systems and call for developing equipment to counter U.S. GPS. In reality, readers need not worry: disrupting satellite navigation systems is remarkably straightforward and, today, hardly a technical challenge at all.

  Why is this the case? It stems from the fundamental operating principles of satellite positioning. To begin, it’s important to clarify one point: jamming a positioning system does not mean jamming the satellites themselves. Since GPS and BDS primarily broadcast signals outward without actively receiving them, direct interference with the satellites is not feasible. Of course, one could target the satellites’ telemetry, tracking, and command (TT&C) links, causing inaccuracies in the satellites’ own position‑determination and control functions and thereby degrading positioning performance. However, this approach is quite difficult to implement: first, you cannot easily gain access to a satellite’s TT&C ground station; even if you could, deploying an antenna as large as the station itself would quickly be detected. Second, attempting to accompany a positioning satellite and jam it from nearby is highly impractical—such an operation would lack sufficient stealth and could only be used in wartime. In peacetime, shadowing another country’s satellite would amount to a declaration of war, and moreover, the cost‑effectiveness of this method is poor. Consequently, satellite‑positioning jamming is typically directed at the positioning receiver itself.

  The commonly employed anti-interference measures essentially involve increasing the radiated power, controlling the nulls of the receiving antenna, and applying coherent signal processing to achieve a certain processing gain.

  However, in positioning receivers, the first two approaches are not feasible. The GPS satellite’s radiated power is only 200 W; with a 20-dB antenna gain, the effective isotropic radiated power amounts to just 20,000 W. Yet these satellites orbit at altitudes exceeding 20,000 km, so on the ground, a single device need only protect a 100‑km‑wide area—meaning that a mere 1 W of power would suffice. Of course, factoring in processing gains of 30 dB or more, even a 100‑W radiated power level could easily degrade the accuracy of satellite positioning, potentially causing the receiver to lose lock. On the ground, delivering 100 W is readily achievable. Moreover, by avoiding narrowband noise and instead modulating with random sequences, additional processing gains can be obtained. Consequently, relatively inexpensive equipment can readily provide coverage and protection over a designated area. Because positioning receivers must simultaneously acquire signals from multiple satellites at the zenith, increasing the baseline between antennas helps improve positioning accuracy. As a result, most receiver antennas employ wide beams, which precludes the use of beam nulling techniques for interference suppression.

  Therefore, missile guidance does not rely on satellite positioning as a means—at least not as the primary one.